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THEODORE GAZA'S DE FATO

FIRST EDITION

CONTAINING THE ORIGINAL GREEK, WITH
INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

JOHN WILSON TAYLOR, M.A., PH.D.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
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PREFACE

In publishing this first edition of Theodore Gaza's *De Fato*, the editor wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness, in the first instance, to the late Dr. Wendland, whose careful collation of three manuscripts, made about thirty years ago for Dr. Ludwig Stein, is the basis of this edition. For the use of the collation, the editor is under obligation to Dr. Stein, who magnanimously gave permission for the publication of the work in America.

Gratitude is due also to Dr. N. W. DeWitt for carrying the collation from Dr. Stein in Berlin, Germany, to America; to Professor G. S. Brett for corrections and many helpful suggestions in the text and translation of the work; and particularly to the Library of the University of Toronto, which made possible the appearance of this edition by consenting to render available funds covering the cost of its publication.

JOHN WILSON TAYLOR

New York City
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INTRODUCTION

Theodore Gaza was a Greek born in Saloniki at the beginning of the fifteenth century. He went to Constantinople about 1422, shortly before the city was besieged by the Sultan Murad II. During the siege he found himself in straightened circumstances and, being too proud to beg, he rented a piece of land, on which he grew produce sufficient to support himself. His fortunes soon improved and, after becoming an intimate of Philelphus, secretary to the Emperor John V, he opened a school in Constantinople. Among his pupils were Syropoulos and Chalcondyles, both of whom later became known as humanists. In these years he apparently took orders with a view to becoming a priest. In 1440 Byzantium's last hope of aid from Rome against the Saracens was extinguished, and in that year Gaza went to Italy, where scholars often found patrons in princes and wealthy citizens.

After his arrival in Italy, Gaza's first need was to acquire a knowledge of Latin. This he did with conspicuous success at the school of Vittorino da Feltre, where, during a three years' course, friends of Philelphus provided him with financial support. In 1447, he became a professor at Ferrara, and the same year he was promoted to the rectorship. The next year a professorship at Florence was offered to him, and in 1451 he was invited to Rome to make translations for Pope Nicholas V. These were mainly of scientific works of Aristotle, but he found time also to turn Cicero's *De Senectute* into Greek. After the pope's death in 1455, Gaza was similarly employed by Alphonso, tyrant of Naples, until the latter's death in 1458. He next applied for patronage to Bessarion, a Greek who, having left Constantinople for Rome in 1438, had entered the Roman Church and become cardinal of Rome. Bessarion befriended Gaza, and in 1465 secured for him a parish in Calabria. Apart from the years 1465-1467, Gaza appears to have spent most of his time at Rome, where he was associated with Bessarion and Andrea, bishop of Alaria, in producing an edition of Pliny, and, after Bessarion's death in 1472, with Andrea alone, in preparing an edition of Aulus Gellius. He retired to his parish in 1477, and died the next year.[1]

In addition to the translations mentioned, Gaza wrote several works that have been printed and a number that still exist only in manuscript form. He is already known as the author of one of the first systematic Greek grammars in Latin. A treatise on the origin of the Turks, an encomium on the dog, and some letters from his hand appear in Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. CLXI.

[1]Cf. *Der Humanist Gaza als Philosoph* by Dr. Ludwig Stein in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, II, 426 ff.

Besides the *De Fato*, there are at least three philosophical tracts hitherto unprinted: (1) ὅτι ἡ φύσις οὐ βουλεύεται (often wrongly referred to as ὅτι ἡ φύσις βουλεύεται)[1], (2) πρὸς Πλήθωνα ὑπὲρ Ἀριστοτέλους and (3) ἀντιρρητικόν. (1) and (2), written in 1459, were, like the *De Fato*, polemics against Pletho, and (3) was a reply to Argyropoulos in behalf of Bessarion,[2] written in 1470 or 1471. There is some ground for thinking that still another polemic was written against Pletho, covering in part the same ground as the *De Fato*, but, if it was, there is as yet no generally known printed record of its survival.[3]

Dr. Ludwig Stein,[4] after consulting the manuscripts of these tracts, wrote that they attract one by their highly realistic and purely philosophic tone. Of their author he said: "If one speaks of genuine philosophers of the fifteenth century, along with Gemistus Pletho and Marsilio Ficino, there is no better claim than that of Theodore Gaza. . . . He was the only one in the fifteenth century who, in spite of his ecclesiastical appointment, represented a pure Aristotelianism entirely free from every theological contamination."

The date of the *De Fato* cannot be exactly determined. It is a reply to Pletho's doctrine of necessity, and seems to be related most closely to two letters from Pletho to Bessarion[5] that are printed in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, CLXI, 713 ff. and 721 ff. These letters are of uncertain date, but, as Gaza was befriended by Bessarion only in 1458, he cannot be supposed to have seen the

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[1]Cf. *A Misunderstood Tract by Theodore Gaza*, by the author, *Archiv f. G. der Phil.*, XXXIII, 150 ff.

[2]Cf. the author's *Pletho's Criticism of Plato and Aristotle* (George Banta Pub. Co., Menasha, Wis., 1921), pp. 16 f.

[3]Cf. 26, 2 and note.

[4]*Der Humanist Gaza als Philosoph*, 429, 427.

[5]Gaspary (*Pletho's Criticism*, 10, n. 25) had already maintained that this correspondence between Pletho and Bessarion was the occasion for the *De Fato*. It becomes practically certain in view of the following parallels: (1) Gaza states that Bessarion does well in his *Defense of Plato* to insist on both free will (the voluntary) and necessity (29, 7). Bessarion does this in these letters (*Pletho's Criticism*, p. 10). (2) Gaza argues in detail for the reconciliation of τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον and τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (27, 28 ff.). Bessarion stated in the letters that, according to Proclus, whom he plainly favoured, God knew ἀναγκαίως τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, CLXI, 718 A). (3) Gaza used the same quotation from Plato's *Republic*, 716 E, as did Bessarion to show Plato's belief in free will (27, 12 and Migne, *ibid.*). (4) Gaza stated that Pletho meant by necessity only that which could not be otherwise (27, 14). Pletho states in these letters alone among his discussions of the subject that this is what he means by the term (Migne, *ibid.*, 722D).

letters before this year. He therefore wrote at least eight years after Pletho's death. This, however, was not the first tract that Gaza wrote against Pletho. It was preceded either by the *De Consultatione Naturae*, written early in 1459, or by an unknown tract. It would be not unlikely that Gaza should have written it no great time after obtaining access to the letters. Moreover, Aristotle's scientific works, which he had been translating prior to 1458, were still fresh in his mind, as we may infer from the fact that they suggested to him several examples used in the *De Fato*. The work might provisionally be assigned to the year 1460.

The relation of the *De Fato* to the whole debate between the Platonists and the Aristotelians was indicated by the author in *Pletho's Criticism* (p. 19), before he had access to the text. It was not dated at all in that treatment, but was numbered third among the tracts of the debate. If, as seems likely, it is as late as 1460, it should be numbered seventh instead of third. The surmise that it was also an answer to the *De Differentia* should be withdrawn.

Specifically, the tract is an answer to Pletho's uncompromising determinism. Pletho had maintained that, in order to find room for chance or free will, one would have to disprove either that nothing arises from nothing[1] or that every cause acts in a definite and determined way.[2] To those who objected that, if all were fixed by law, there was no room for divine guidance of the universe and no benefit in prayer, he had replied that fixed law was God's will and that any definite request for God's intervention was not only useless but impious, since it implied either that God had intended to bring a worse thing to pass or that He might be corrupted into a departure from the best.[3]

Gaza did not reply to Pletho's arguments on their merits, but attacked his assumption of having Plato's authority for the position. In the first part of the tract, he argued that Plato and Aristotle agreed in admitting the existence of both free will and necessity and, in the second part, he maintained a like thesis in regard to chance and necessity.

The plan of the first part may be followed more readily with the help of the accompanying diagram, which represents the classification of voluntary and involuntary wrongs as made by Aristotle and adopted by Gaza.

The tract opens with a number of paradoxical statements quoted from Plato and Aristotle. These Gaza proposed to explain

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[1]Cf. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, I, 150.

[2]*i.e.*, does not, *qua* cause, disappear. Cf. *ibid.*, I, 216.

[3]Cf. *Pletho's Criticism*, 88, n. 34.

did something to deliver philosophy from the obligation of reaching conclusions agreed to in advance.

This text of Gaza's *De Fato* is derived from a collation made by the late Dr. Wendland of the following three manuscripts: (1) in the Laurentian Library, plut. 55, 9, pp. 49-57 (L); (2) in the Vatican Library, codex 1393, pp. 34 ff. (V); (3) in the Regia Christia Library at the Vatican, codex 164, pp. 25 ff. (R).

The text of R is the most corrupt. I have counted forty-seven palpable errors in it which were not present in either of the other manuscripts, as against nine in L and six in V. L and R appear to be less closely related to each other than either of them is to V. In no case do they agree in any error, except when all the manuscripts are incorrect. L and V agree in seven errors as compared with six in which R and V agree, those cases not being counted in which the three share the same error.

Twenty-four corrections and emendations have been introduced, most of them slight and such as seemed necessary to make the text intelligible or orthographically and syntactically sound. They are as follows: 11, 8; 11, 18; 12, 21; 13, 4; 13, 12; 13, 18; 13, 29; 14, 8; 14, 15; 14, 22; 14, 24; 15, 8; 15, 23; 15, 26; 16, 24; 16, 29; 16, 30; 17, 11; 17, 14; 17, 18; 17, 25; 18, 4; 18, 14; 18, 15. The *apparatus criticus* indicates the change in each case. Irrespective of the manuscript readings and without notation of variations among them, δ has been written instead of θ in οὐδείς and μηδείς, the second γ has been retained in γίγνεσθαι and ττ has been written instead of σσ in πράττειν and ἥττων. Incorrect accentuation has been rectified without record in the *apparatus criticus*.

ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΕΚΟΥΣΙΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΑΚΟΥΣΙΟΥ

Περὶ δὲ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξίς γε ἀποβλέπων· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. ταὐτὸ δ' ἂν εἴη καὶ ὀρεκτόν. ὄρεξις γὰρ ἀεὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ὄντος ἢ φαινομένου.

Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἄτοπον εἴ τις ἀγαθοῦ ὀρεγόμενος καὶ πράττων τῶν ἀγαθῶν τι, ἀκουσίως πράττειν τε καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι λέγοιτο. καὶ αὖ εἰ ἑκών τις πράττοι τὰ φαῦλα καὶ πράττων ἀνέχοιτο ἀδοξίαν ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖν καὶ πορίζεσθαι τὰ κακὰ ὑφ' ὧν ἂν ἀπόλοιτο, ὥσπερ ἐχθρὸς ὢν ἑαυτῷ, καίτοι ἄνθρωπος φύσει φυλακτικὸς ἑαυτοῦ γενόμενος καὶ πεφυκὼς πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸ συμφέρον διώκειν. ἔτι δὲ ἀτοπώτερον εἰ ἄκων γε πλημμελεῖ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ οὔσης πράττειν καὶ μὴ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα εἰδώς, οἷον τίνα, τί, περὶ τί, τίνι, ἕνεκα τίνος, πῶς. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπ' ἀκουσίοις δίκην διδόναι καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἑκουσίοις ἔτι δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ ἄκων τις πράττει, συγγνώμης ἄξιος. εἰ δ' ἑκὼν ὀρεγόμενος ἀγαθοῦ, πῶς δίκαιον τιμωρεῖσθαι τὸν μετιόντα τι ἀγαθόν. πολλῷ δ' ἀτοπώτερον τὸ ἐπὶ βιαίοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων ἐν τῇ τῶν βιαίων ἀρχῇ.

Γίγνεταί γε μὴν ταῦτα καὶ λέγεται πρᾶξαι μέν τινα ὀρεγόμενον, ἀκουσίως δέ. οἵ τε γὰρ χειμαζομένης τῆς νεὼς ἐκβάλλοντες τὰ φορτία ἐφ' ᾧ σώζεσθαι ἄκοντες οὕτω δρᾶν λέγονται.

Καὶ Πλάτων μὲν ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἐλλογίμων μηδένα ἑκόντα ἀλλὰ πάντας ἄκοντας πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα φησίν. βίᾳ δὲ τοὺς διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἑταῖρός τε Πλάτωνος καὶ τὰ περὶ σοφίαν οὐχ ἥττων δοκῶν πάντα ὀντινοῦν φαῦλον ἑκόντα πράττειν τὰ κακὰ οἴεται. διὸ καὶ προσαπορητέον αὖ πῶς ἄμφω ὄντες οἵδε σοφοὶ πάμπολυ διαφωνοῦντες ἀλλήλοις τυγχάνουσι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τοὺς γάρ τοι ὁμοίους καὶ ὅμοια φρονεῖν τε καὶ λέγειν χρεών. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἵρεσιν καταστησαμένους τὸν μὲν ἐπαινεῖν, τὸν δὲ μή, τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶνδε ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀποδεκτέον. διαιροῦντας δὲ καὶ διορίζοντας τὰ τούτοις διαπορούμενα λύειν προθυμητέον καὶ συμβιβαστέον τῷ ἀνδρε ἐφ' οἷς διαφέρειν δοκεῖτον σκοπουμένους τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἑκατέρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ λέξιν περιεργαζομένους καὶ ἐρίζοντας μάτην διαλεκτέον.

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7. πράττειν LV. ἑαυτῷ post περιποιεῖν L. 8. καίτοι scripsi.
10-11. τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐν αὐτῷ οὔσης πράττειν καὶ μὴ post καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα L.
11-12. εἰδώς . . . πῶς in marg. L.
15-16. πολλῷ . . . ἀρχῇ in marg. L.
18. ἐφῷ codd. Correxi.
21. φησί R. 21-22. βίᾳ δὲ τοὺς διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν in marg. L.
23. ἥττον L. 24. αὖ] νῦν R. 25. γάρ τοι] γάρ L. 26. αἵρεσιν LV.
28. τούτοις] corr. ex. ταυτ R. ταύτῃ LV. 29. τῷ] τε V.
30. ὡς post ἀλλὰ R. τὴν post μὴ R.

Λέγομεν δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν ὃ ἄν τις τῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς πράττῃ καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν μήθ' ὃν μήθ' ᾧ μήθ' οὗ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστα μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ πράττῃ. ἀκούσιον δὲ οὗ ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι. κατ' ἄγνοιαν δέ τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γιγνόμενον καὶ ἐπίλυπόν τε καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ὄν. ἔτι τε τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὸ βίᾳ πραττόμενον. τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν. ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ καὶ λυπηρόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ συγγνωμονικὸν ἂν εἴη. διαφερέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν. καὶ συγγνωμονικὰ μὲν ἔστω ὅσα μὴ ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἁμαρτάνουσιν καὶ πεπραχότες δυσχεραίνουσιν ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει. οὐ συγγνωμονικὰ δὲ ὅσα μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες, μὴ διὰ πάθος δέ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτε ἀνθρωπικόν.

Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ὑποκείσθω. καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα λυτέον τοὺς ἐναντίους τῶν λόγων καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη μηδὲν ἀλλήλοις δοξάζοντας ἐναντίον ἀποδεικτέον.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀκουσίως ὀρεγόμενόν τινα πράττειν, ἁπλῶς μὲν οὕτω φάναι, οὐκ ἀληθές, πως δὲ καὶ πῃ ἀληθές. ἔστι καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἀποβαλλομένους ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἁπλῶς μὲν ἀκουσίως πράττειν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἁπλῶς ἕλοιτο τὰ ὄντα ἀποβαλεῖν, πῃ δὲ ἑκουσίως· ᾗ μέλλοιεν ἂν ταύτῃ σώζεσθαι γενόμενοι ἐν κινδύνῳ. οἷον δή τον καὶ τὸ Ὁμήρῳ λεχθὲν· ἑκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ. οὐ δὴ ἄτοπον εἰ κατά τι μὲν ἑκουσίως, ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀκουσίως ἡ πρᾶξις. ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως γε ἀκουσίως, τό γε ἑκόντα τινὰ πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα ἀληθῶς μὲν λέγεται, ἑκούσιον γὰρ ἦν οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ. τοῦτο δὲ ἑκάστῳ τῶν φαύλων ὑπάρχει. ἄτοπον δὲ οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ πράττων τὰ φαῦλα τυγχάνει ὀρεγόμενος τῶν φαύλων ᾗ φαῦλα καὶ ἐναντία τε καὶ φθαρτικὰ ἑαυτῷ ἀλλ' ᾗ ἀγαθὰ καὶ φυλακτικά· ἢ γὰρ ὡς συμφερόντων ἢ ὡς ἡδέων αὐτῷ. διττὸν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ ὄρεξίς γε ἀμφοῖν. τῷ μὲν σπουδαίῳ τοῦ ὄντος τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τοῦ φαινομένου. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι δὲ δίκαιον τοὺς τοιούτους. οὐχ ὅτι ἀγαθοῦ τυγχάνουσιν ὀρεγόμενοι ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος ὡς ὄντος. φαῦλον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο. ὥστε συμβαίνει δὴ ὀρέγεσθαι φαύλου ὀρεγομένῳ ἀγαθοῦ. ἔφεσίς γε κακοῦ οὐδενὶ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσαν γὰρ πρᾶξίν τε καὶ προαίρεσιν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους λέγοντος ἔστιν ἀκοῦειν.

1. ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντων] ἑαυτὸν R. ἑαυτῶν ὄντων V. πράττει R. 2. ὃν V.
5. βίαιον καὶ τὸ in marg. L. 7-8. τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα πράττειν om. R.
8. συγγνωμονικὰ V. 9. καὶ πεπραχότες. . . . πράξει in marg. L.
16. καὶ γὰρ] γὰρ καὶ L.
16-17. ἀποβαλλομένους ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσι] ἐκβάλλοντας τὰ φορτία in rasura et in marg. ἄλλως, τοὺς ἀποβαλλομένους τὰ φορτία L.
17. ἕλοιτο] ὄναιτο R. 18. τά] τό R. 20. οὐ δή] οὐδὲ R.
21. ταυτα R. ταυτά V. καὶ ὡσαύτως γε ἀκουσίως, τό γε ἑκόντα om. R. τὸ δὲ LV. 22. γὰρ post μὲν R. 24. ὑπάρχοι R. οὐδὲν om. R.
26. φθαρτικά] φοντικά R.
27. αὐτῷ RV. δὲ om. R. 31. τοιοῦτον R. ὥστε καὶ R. ὥς γε V.
32. γε] τε RV.
32-33. πᾶσαν γὰρ . . . . ἀκοῦειν in marg. L. 33. λέγον R.

Οὐκ ἔξω μέντοι κακίας ᾧ συμβέβηκεν· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ὀρέγεται συμβαίνει τῷ λόγῳ. αὐτὸς δὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς τε καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ὅπερ ὀρεγόμενος πράττει φαῦλον ὁμοίως. μοχθηρῶς τε πράττει ἁπλῶς ὀρεγόμενος τοῦ ἁπλῶς φαύλου ὡς του τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἄκοντι δὲ συγγνώμη ὡς μεταμελομένῳ· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ συγγνώμη, τῷ δὲ μὴ μεταμελομένῳ οὔ. ἐγγὺς γὰρ οὗτός γε τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντός τε καὶ ἑκόντος καὶ ὡς ἀγνοῶν ἔστω. ἐγγὺς δ' ὄντες κἂν μεταδοῖεν ἀλλήλοις εὐλόγως τοῦ ἰδίου ὀνόματος. ὡς τόν τε δι' ἄγνοιαν ἡμαρτηκότα καὶ μὴ μεταμελόμενον ἑκόντα πως καὶ ἀγνοοῦντα ἡμαρτηκέναι λέγεσθαι. καὶ τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα αὖ καὶ ἑκόντα ἁμαρτάνοντα δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ οὐχ ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα ἁμαρτάνειν.

Ὥσπερ ἄρα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα λέγει οὐ τὰ βίαια μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λαθραῖα· οἷον κλοπήν, μοιχείαν, φαρμακείαν, προαγωγείαν, δουλαπατίαν, δολοφονίαν, ψευδομαρτυρίαν. ἀκούσια γὰρ ταῦτα, ὡς οὐχ ἑκούσια ἂν εἴη. ὅ τε γὰρ πάσχων ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἁμαρτάνει, βίαιά τε οὐκ ἔστιν οἷς δὴ ὥρισται τὸ ἀκούσιον. ὁ δὴ μοχθηρὸς ἑκὼν μὲν πράττει τὰ μοχθηρὰ ὅτι εἰδὼς τὰ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ἄκων δὲ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν μοχθηρός, ὡς Πλάτων φησίν. οὐδὲ βούλεταί τις ὃ μὴ οἴεται σπουδαῖον, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνῳδὰ Πλάτωνι λέγει. οὐχ ἑκὼν ἄρα βούλεταί τις τὰ φαῦλα καὶ βουλευσάμενός τε καὶ κρίνας ὀρέγεται κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις. βουλευτὰ δὲ καὶ προαιρετὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ οὐχ ἑκὼν τοίνυν πράττει τὰ φαῦλα ὁ μοχθηρός, ἢν δέ τις τῶν οὐχ ἑκόντων καὶ ἄκων. ὅθεν δὴ Πλάτων μὲν εἰς τὸ κακόν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ εἰς τὸ λαθραῖον, μετενεγκὼν τῷ τοῦ ἀκουσίου ὀνόματι χρῆται.

Ἔτι δὲ οὐδ' εἰ τὸ ἀκούσιον οὐ βούλεται λέγεσθαι εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον ἀλλ' εἴ τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα πραττομένων, διὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπαράδεκτον ἂν εἴη τοὔνομα ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ συμφέρον γε ἀγνοοῦντος· ἑκὼν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον. οὐχ ἑκὼν ἄρα καὶ μεταλαμβάνεται τοὔνομα, ἄκων ὥσπερ καὶ ἀκούσια τὰ λαθραῖα.

Τριχῶς δὴ ὁ ἄκων. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ ὁ ὡς ἀγνοῶν ἢ ὁ ἀγνοῶν, ὧν τὸν μὲν δι' ἄγνοιαν Πλάτων ἀγνοίᾳ συνέχεσθαι ἁπλῆ λέγει·

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1. ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτο post κακίας in marg. L.
3-4. μοχθηρῶς . . . . τῶν ἀγαθῶν in marg. L.
4. ὡς του scripsi. ὡς τοῦ codd. μεταμελουμένῳ R.
5. τῷ δὲ μὴ] ὡς R.
7. ἐγγὺς usque ad θηριότητος (p. 14, l. 14) in marg. L.
9. λέγεσθαι] λογίζεσθαι R. 11. συναλάγματα R. τὰ] γὰρ R.
12. λαθρέα R. φαρμακίαν R. 13. προαγωγίαν codd. δουλοφονίαν R. δολοφωνίαν L.V.
17-18. ὃ μὴ . . . . τις om. R. 18. συνῳδὰ codd.. 20. βουλετὰ L.
20. τὰ om. R. 21. περὶ ἃ] πρὸς R. 24. χρῆσθαι R.
27-28. γε ἀγνοοῦντος . . . . συμφέρον om. R.
29. μεταλαμβανεται] μεταλαμβάνοντι codd.
30. ὁ post primum ἢ om. R. 30-31. ἢ ὁ ἀγνοῶν om. R.
31. ἀγνοίᾳ om. R. Lemma ad Πλάτων L: σφαλλόμενον τῆς τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξης ἐνίοτε ἁμαρτάνειν λέγει. Cf. p. 15, ll. 8, 9.

τὸν δ' ἀγνοοῦντα διπλῇ· ὁ δὲ ὡς ἀγνοῶν οὔτ' ἀγνοεῖ οὔτε οἶδε. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ ἑκὼν ὅτι πέπραχεν ὃ μὴ ᾔδει. ἔστω ὡς διπλῇ ἀμαθαίνων ἀγνοίᾳ. τῷ μὲν οὖν δι' ἄγνοιαν συγγνωστέον, τῷ δὲ ὡς ἀγνοοῦντι καὶ τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι οὐ συγγνωστέον.

5 Διττὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ βίαιον, τὸ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ δὲ ἔνδοθεν. ὅ τε γὰρ παρ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς πράττων βίᾳ λέγεται πράττειν καὶ ὁ ὑπὸ πνεύματος βίᾳ ποι ἐνεχθεὶς βίᾳ ἠνέχθη. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἔξωθεν βιαίοις οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δ' ἔνδοθεν πᾶς νοῦν ἔχων. ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς βίᾳ μὲν πράττει ὅτι παρὰ τοὺς λογισμούς, οὐ μέντοι ἀναίτιος. ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ
10 οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γέγονεν ἀκρατής. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὁ διὰ κακίαν θυμοῦ καὶ ὀργῆς δυναστευόμενος βίᾳ ἂν πράττοι τὰ κακά, ὡς Πλάτων φησί; βίᾳ γε. (εἴ τι κἂν τούτοις παρὰ τοὺς λογισμούς.) ἔοικε δὲ μὴ πάντῃ πάντως ἀλογίστους καὶ ἀσυνέτους τῶν καλῶν εἶναι τοὺς κακούς. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν, κακίας, ἀκρασίας, θηριότητος, ἐν ἁπάσῃ ἴσως
15 κακίᾳ καὶ ἀκρασίᾳ ἐπινοεῖν δεῖ ἁμῶς γέ πως εἰ μή τις ἐπὶ τὸ θηριῶδες ἦθος ὑπερβολὴ εἴη. καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκων λέγοιτο ἕκαστος πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα ὡς ἀγόμενος προπετέστερον εἰς τὴν πρᾶξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. ὥστε καὶ πάλιν οὐ κακῶς Πλάτων ἄκοντας τῶν φαύλων τοὺς διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἡδονὴν ἁμαρτάνοντας πράττειν φησίν. ἀκούσιον γὰρ ἦν καὶ τὸ βίαιον.

20 Τοῖς δὲ παραιτουμένοις ἢ ἀπολογουμένοις οὐδὲν προὔργου τὸ βίᾳ, τοῦτό γε τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις καὶ ἄγον. τιμωρητέα γὰρ ὅτι εἰς τοῦτό τις ἑκὼν ἥκοι ὥστε ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους καὶ βίᾳ ῥᾳδιουργεῖν.

Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διενηνόχασιν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Πλάτων οὕτω περὶ ἑκουσίου καὶ ἀκουσίου εἰπόντες. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίως

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1. Post διπλῇ add. in marg. L τῷ μὲν οὖν δι' ἄγνοιαν συγγνωστέον· Post ἀγνοῶν, ἐπειδὴ L. Post οἶδε, ἑκὼν L. 3. ἄγνοιαν] ἄγνωιαν L.

6. λογικοὺς R. 7. βιαίος L. 8. ἐπιτιμᾷ codd. πῶς R.

15. ἀκρασιας LV ἀκρασία τι R. ὁμως RV ἄλλως L.

16. βίᾳ καὶ in marg. L.

17-22. ὥστε . . . . ῥαδιουργεῖν in marg. L; in ras. καὶ οὖν Πλάτων ποτὲ μὲν πάντα φαῦλον ἄκοντα εἶναι φαῦλον φησὶ ποτὲ δὲ βουλόμενον καὶ ἐθέλοντα. ἄκοντα δὲ ὡς ἑτέρως καὶ αὐτὸς φησι τὸν δι' ἄγνοιαν. λέγων δίκαιον(?) μὲν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν κρατοῦσαν ἐν ψυχαῖς καὶ διακοσμοῦσαν. ἐὰν δὲ σφάλλεται (sc. σφάλληταί) τι δοξάζεσθαι(?) ἀκούσιον ἀδικίαν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην βλάβην. δύσερίν τε τὸν περὶ ὀνομάτων λόγον καλεῖ. ὡς ἄρα ὁμολογῶν μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούσιον τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἐπίλυπον, τιθεὶς δὲ καὶ ἕτερον ἀκούσιον τὸ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἥκιστα ἀχθομένου ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει. ἐφ' οἷς οὕτω φράζει· "ἄγνοιαν λέγων ἄν τις τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἂν ψεύδοιτο". τουτὶ δὲ καὶ ἑκούσιον ὡς ἑτέρως ἂν λεγεσθαι οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἁπαξιοῖ λέγων· "ἡδονήν γε φαμὲν δυναστεύουσαν πράττειν πᾶν ὅτι περ ἂν αὐτῆς ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ. τὸ γὰρ βούλεσθαί τε καὶ ἐθέλειν οὐκ ἄκοντος, ἀλλ' ἑκόντος ἐστί. μηδ' ἔστω μηδ' ἡμῖν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὁ λόγος δύσερις.

22. ῥαδισουργεῖν codd. 24. καὶ post ἑκουσίως codd.

τοὺς φαύλους τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν φησίν, ὁ δε ἀκουσίως ἢ ὡς οὐχ ἑκόντας ἢ ὡς βίᾳ καὶ κρατουμένους ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. ἐπεὶ ὡς ἑτέρως γε ἑκόντας καὶ αὐτὸς λέγει πράττειν τοὺς μοχθηρούς, ὧδε φράζων· ἡδονὴν δὲ φαμὲν δυναστεύουσαν πράττειν ὅτι περ ἂν αὐτῆς ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ. τὸ γὰρ βούλεσθαί τε καὶ ἐθέλειν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἄκοντος ἀλλ' ἑκόντος ἐστίν. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἑκόντας ὡς δ' ἄκοντας οἴεται πράττειν· νόμους τε περὶ ἑκουσίων ἀδικημάτων τίθεται ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἑκόντας τινας ὑπειληφὼς κακουργεῖν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκούσιον τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἐπίλυπον λέγει, ὁ δὲ τὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξης ἔσθ' ὅτε σφαλλόμενον. καίτοι λέγων δὴ καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξα κρατοῦσα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ διακοσμοῦσα ἐὰν σφάλληταί τι δοξάζεται ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον ἀδικίαν οὐ πάνυ τι ἐναντιοῦται τῇ δόξῃ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν περὶ ὀνομάτων λόγον δύσερίν ἀποκαλῶν καὶ ἥκιστα ἀποδεχόμενος, ἄλλως ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρον ὀνομάζει τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα. εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἀκούσιον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ κρατεῖσθαι καὶ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους ἀλογίστους καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ὄντας ἧττον μὲν ἢ κατὰ θηριώδεις μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ κατὰ ἀκρατεῖς, τοῦτό γε διαφορὰν ὀνόματος μᾶλλον ἢ νοήματος ἔχον θορυβεῖ τοὺς μᾶλλον φιλαριστοτέλεις ὄντας ἢ φιλοσόφους· ἐπεὶ ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης βουλόμενος λέγει προστιθεὶς τὸ μηδὲ βίᾳ ἐν τῷ τοῦ ἑκουσίου λόγῳ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ μήποτε ἑκὼν πράξει τὰ φαῦλα, ἄλλως τε καὶ ᾗ φαῦλα, βίᾳ δ' ἂν πράξειεν. ἔστι γὰρ τὰ βίᾳ ᾗ δὴ καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ὁπόσα παρ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων.

Πλήθων δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάντα καὶ μηδὲν ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν οἰόμενος γίγνεσθαι συνῳδὰ ἑαυτῷ καὶ Πλάτωνα φάναι πειρᾶται δεικνύναι ὡς εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄκων εἴη ἀκόλαστος· ἢ γὰρ δι' ἀμαθίαν ἢ δι' ἀκράτειαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὅτι Πλήθωνι ἡ ἀπάτη παρὰ τοῦ μοναχῶς λαμβάνειν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον πολλαχῶς ὄν. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ καὶ οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζῆν ὡς συναιτίου, οἷον τὸ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἡ τροφὴ καὶ οὗ ἄνευ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ τι ἀποβαλεῖν κακόν, οἷον τὸ πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον· καὶ τὸ βίαιον· καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν· καὶ τὸ ὡς ὕλη ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς καὶ αἱ τῆς ὕλης κινήσεις. ἔνθα δὴ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ταδὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ. τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ἀναγκαίου, Πλάτων τῇ μὲν ὡς τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως φησὶ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄκοντα εἶναι ἀκόλαστον, τῇ δὲ ὡς τὸ βίᾳ, μετειληφὼς ἐγγύθεν τἀναγκαῖον ἐκ τοῦ βιαίου εἰς τὸ βίᾳ διὰ τὸ κρατοῦν τε καὶ ἄγον τοῦ φαύλου ἤθους. βίᾳ γὰρ ἐστὶν

1-13. ἀκουσίως . . . . πρᾶγμα in marg. L. et in rasura ὅτι περ ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ βούλησις ἐθελήσῃ πράττειν· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκούσιον τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἐπίλυπον, ὁ δὲ τὸ τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης ἔσθ' ὅτε σφαλλόμενον. Cf. p. 14, ll. 17-22, n.

3. δὲ] γε LV.

5. Post ἐστίν, μὴ γὰρ ἔστω ὁ λόγος δύσερις περὶ ὀνομάτων in marg. L. Cf. p. 15, l. 12. 5-6. μὲν . . . . περὶ om. R. 7. τιθέναι R.

8. τοῦ scripsi. Cf. *Rep.* 864A et p. 13, l. 31, n.

10. σφάλληται R. 11. χαλεπαιν post τι L. 17. ὄντας ἢ φιλοσόφους] ἢ φιλοσόφους ὄντας E. 18. μὴ δὲ RV.

19. πράξῃ L. 20. γὰρ] καὶ RV. ἢ δεῖ R.

23. γίγνεσθαι in marg. V. συνῳδὰ codd. 26. τοῦ] τὸ codd.

ὁπόσα παρὰ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων, ὡς εἴρηται. βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κινήσει ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. ὁ γάρ τοι ἀκόλαστος ἄκων τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς τὸ βίᾳ, καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολασταίνει
5 ὡς τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. εἰ γὰρ πρᾶξις τοιαύτη καὶ ἕξις ἂν εἴη ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοιαύτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες τῶν φαύλων· οἷον δὴ καὶ σωτὴρ ὁ θεοῦ φησιν· ὅτι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ κακὰ ἐν ἀνθρώποις. φεῦ δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δι' οὗ πράττεται τὰ κακά. καὶ ὅλως ἐπὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ φθειρομένων ὁμοίως· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ αἴτια δεῖ, εἰ μέλλει τι
10 γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ φθείρεσθαι. οὐ μὴν δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεταί τε καὶ φθείρεται ἁπλῶς, ὡς τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐνδεχομένως. καὶ πολὺ τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς τὸ ὡς ὕλη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ τῆς ὕλης.

Πλάτων μὲν δὴ οὕτω πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἀκόλαστον λέγων οὔτε
15 προαίρεσιν οὔτε τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀναιρεῖ καὶ ὡς μηδὲν μηδαμῇ ἀντιφάσκων αὐτῷ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁμαρτάνειν τοὺς φαύλους φησίν, ὁτὲ δὲ αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ ἑλομένου· θεὸν δ' ἀναίτιον.

Πλήθων δὲ τἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὡς τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν λαμβάνων οἴεται πάντα ἁπλῶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ
20 φθείρεσθαι. ἀναιρεῖ τε οὐ μόνον προαίρεσίν τε καὶ βούλησιν ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσιν αὐτήν. φύσις γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὕλη. (πότερον δὲ ὡς ὕλη τὸ προαιρετικὸν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον αὐτοπροαίρετόν τε καὶ αὐτεξούσιον ἢ ἕτερον καὶ εἰ ἕτερον πῶς ἕτερον, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος.) οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἀναιρεῖ. ἀρχὴ γὰρ καὶ αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι τὸ συμβεβηκός ἐστί, τοῦ γε εἶναί
25 τινα μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μηδ' ἀεὶ μηδ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀλλ' ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν. συναιροῦνται δὲ καὶ λιταὶ καὶ εὐχαὶ καὶ πᾶσα ἱεροποιία. τί γὰρ δεῖ θεὸν ἵλεων καὶ σωτῆρα καὶ ἀποτροπαῖον καὶ ἀλεξίκακον ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, εἴ γε πάντα γίγνεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης;

Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὔθ' εἱμαρμένην οὔτ' ἀνάγκην γε ἀναιροῦμεν. τό τε
30 ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον φυλαττόμενον δείκνυμεν. θεόν τε αὐτόν γε

1. λογισμοὺς R. 4. καὶ prius om. LV. 5. ὡς in marg. V.

7. Cf. Luke XVII, 1: Ἀνενδεκτόν ἐστιν τοῦ τὰ σκάνδαλα μὴ ἐλθεῖν, πλὴν οὐαὶ δι' οὗ ἔρχεται.

8. τὰ κακὰ in marg. L.

14-17. in marg. L. 14. δὴ] γὰρ R. 15. μὴ δαμῶς R. 16. αὐτῷ RV.

21. ἡ om. R. 21-23. πότερον . . . . λόγος om. R.

21—p. 18, l. πότερον . . . . χριστιανῷ, in marg. L et in rasura οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ βίᾳ (?) πως τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις καὶ ἄγον, (ἄλλως προὔργου ἂν εἴη τοῖς in marg.) πλέον τι ἐκ τούτου συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνέγκλητα εἶναι τὰ κακουργήματα (ἄλλως μοχθηρά in marg.) λέγουσιν. τιμωρητέα γὰρ ὅτι εἰς τοῦτό τις ἑκὼν ἥκοι ὥστε ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἀκουσίως πως ῥαδιουργεῖν. Cf. p. 14, ll. 20-23.

24. τοῦ γε] τὸ codd. 26. δὴ R. σωτῆρα καὶ post θεόν. L.

29. οὔτ'] καὶ codd. γε] τε R.

30. τὸ post καὶ scripsi. φυλάττεσθαι R.

οὐδ' ἡμεῖς φαμὲν τρεπτὸν λιταῖς καὶ θυσίαις. δεῖν γε μὴν χρῆσθαι λιτῇ καὶ θυσίᾳ καὶ ὁπόσα θεοσεβοῦς διανοίας νενόμισται ἔργα πρός τινος τροπὴν καὶ μεταβολήν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέλλον. τοῦ γὰρ μέλλοντος εἰς τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡ μεταβολὴ τοῖς εὐχομένοις καὶ θύουσιν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶν γίγνεται τὸ
5 μελλῆσαν, οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐσόμενον καὶ τὸ μέλλον. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔσται, δεῖν τοῦτο εἶναι ποτε ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ. ὃ δὲ νῦν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι μέλλει, οὐδὲν κωλύειν δὴ μὴ γίγνεσθαι. ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ Ὅμηρος τοῦτο δηλοῖ λέγων·

Στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί
10 τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀρετὴ τιμή τε βίη τε
καὶ μὲν τοὺς θυέεσσι καὶ εὐχωλῆς' ἀγανῇσι.
λοίβῃ τε κνίσσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι.

Αὐτὸς δ' ὁ θεὸς ἀμεταβλήτως περαίνει ταὐτό. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν εἱμαρμένης τε καὶ ἀνάγκης τῶν γιγνομένων ἁπάντων αἴτιον καὶ σωστικὸν τοῦ
15 εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ τέτακται ἐξ ἀϊδίου τῷ θεῷ, οὕτω καὶ γίγνεται πάντα, καὶ ὡς πέφυκεν εἶναί τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι οὕτω καὶ ἔστι καὶ γίγνεται. καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, διάταξις καὶ φύσις τοιάδε τῶν ὄντων ἀΐδιος, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἔχουσα τὸ πεπρώμενον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ γὰρ ἔδει τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια τὰ δὲ φθαρτὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτω τετάχθαι ἔδει. καὶ εἴ τι
20 μέλλει ὁρᾶσθαι, φῶς ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκη. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς. καὶ εἰ ὄστρακον γίγνεσθαι μέλλει, θερμότητα ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκη ἐξικμάζουσαν τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐκ τοῦ γεώδους· καὶ εἰ τοδί, τοδί. λανθάνει δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαίου.

Ἄιτια μὲν οὖν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἄλλα ἄλλοις. κοινὸν δ' ἅπασι τοῦ
25 εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι οὕτω τὸ τετάχθαι τε καὶ εἱμόρθαι οὕτως ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου. τῶν τεταγμένων δ' ἄρα καὶ εἱμαρμένων καὶ τὸ ὅσια μὲν πράττοντας σώζεσθαι, ἀνόσια δὲ ἀπόλλυσθαι. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις.

Καλῶς δὲ καὶ Βησσαρίωνι τῷ ἱεράρχῃ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ Πλάτωνος λόγοις
30 περὶ εἱμαρμένης λέγοντι ἅμα τό τε ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ εἱμαρμένον φυλάττεται, διώρισταί τε ὅλως αὐτῷ περὶ εἱμαρμένης ἱκανῶς ἐφ' ὅσον ὁ σκοπὸς ἦν καὶ

2-3. πρὸς μεταβολήν τινος καὶ τροπήν R. 5. μελῆσαν R. ἀληθὲς om. LV.
7. κολύειν L. γενέσθαι RV. πόλλα post γίγνεσθαι L. 8. ταύτῃ] ταύτην R.
11. εὐχολῆς' codd. 13. ἀμεταβλήτως] corr. ex αμεταπτώτως L. αμεταβολήτως R. εὐθεῖα (sc. εὐθεῖα) πορευόμενος, ἤ (sc. ᾗ) φησι Πλάτων post ταὐτό R. 14. σωστικὸν] corr. ex διαφυλακτικὸν L. φυλακτικὸν R. τοῦ scripsi.
17. ἡ om. R. 18. πεπρώμενον καὶ om. R. πεπρόμενον LV.
19. τοῦτο R. 19-21. καὶ εἰ . . . . διαφανοῦς om. LV.
25. εἱμάρθαι codd. 27-28. περὶ τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις in marg. V. τούτου R.
29. καλῶς] εὖ R.
30. ἅμα post φυλάττεται R.
31. ὥρισται R. ὅλως αὐτῷ om. R.

ᾗ προσῆκε χριστιανῷ φιλοσόφῳ. οὐκ εὖ δὲ Πλήθων οἰδὲ τὸ μὴ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ διῃρῆσθαι Πλάτωνι εἰς το ἁπλῶς ἀναγκαῖον ἀνάγει. οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ καὶ ταύτῃ διαιρεῖν ἀξιοῖ Πλάτων διὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἁπλῶς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄφυκτα φησὶν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτου γε ἀναγκαίου ὡς πορρωτάτω τὸν λόγον ποιούμενος ἑτέρως διαιρεῖ, καὶ οὕτως ὡς μήτε τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀναιρεῖν τό τε καινότερον αὐτῷ ἀνίειν τῆς διαιρέσεως. φανερῶς γὰρ ταύτῃ διαφέρειν φησίν, ᾗ ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἀεὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξης σφαλλόμενος πράττει, ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος σπανίως καὶ μικρὰ ἄττα, καὶ ταύτην δὴ δυξάζεσθαι ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀκούσιον εἶναι ἀδικίαν. τὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ διαιρούμενα Πλάτωνι τῷ σφαλερῷ καὶ ἀσφαλεστέρῳ διῄρηται, ἀνάγκη τε λόγου οὐδεμία ἐνθένδε τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων καὶ γιγνομένων τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀποβάλλειν.

Διαπορεῖν μέν τοίνυν περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν λόγων καλόν· διαφορῶν δὲ πλῆθος τιθέναι ἀσυμβάτων ἐν τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Πλάτωνος λόγοις, κατασχίζειν τε τὼ ἄνδρε, καὶ τοῖς περὶ ὁποτερονοῦν συστᾶσι ἐρίζειν τε καὶ φιλονεικεῖν, οὐ καλόν. ἀλλὰ συμβιβάζειν ὅτι περ ἂν διενηνοχέναι δοκῶσιν ἄμεινον, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ὡς ἑνὶ ἑπομένους ἡγεμόνι παιδείας τε καὶ σοφίας ἀρίστῳ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐμμελῶς· ἄμφω γὰρ τὼ ἄνδρε σοφὼ καὶ αἰδοῦς ἀξίω.

Τέλος

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1. φιλοσόφῳ post ᾗ R. ἁπλᾶ γε δόξῃ φιλοσόφω προσῆκε χριστιανῷ in marg. L.. R. add. post φιλοσόφῳ, p. 16, ll. 21-23 (πότερον . . . . λόγος) verbatim nisi ἄλλου λόγου pro ἄλλος λόγος.
2. διηρῦσθαι R. 4. καὶ post δὴ codd. ἄφυατε R.
7. διαιρέσεως] διαλέξεως LV.
8. σφαλόμενος R. 9. δεῖ R. 10. δέ] δὴ V.
10. καὶ ἀκουσίῳ in marg. R; om. LV. 11. διήρηται codd. λόγων R.
14. ἀσύμβατον codd.
16, 18 τὼ] τε R. 15. συστάντας codd. 19. τέλος om. LV.

THE VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY

BY

THEODORE GAZA

One would naturally undertake an inquiry into the voluntary and involuntary by considering the individual persons and circumstances concerned in moral activity,[1] since the end of moral activity is either the good or the apparent good; this end might also, of
5 course, be called the desirable, for desire has always as its object what really is good or what (merely) appears so.

Now it would seem strange that, if one desired a good thing and performed a good deed, one should be said to act and desire involuntarily.[2] On the other hand, it would seem strange that a
10 person should voluntarily do wrong, thereby being content to bring infamy on himself and, just as if he were his own enemy, to lay up for himself such evils as are calculated to ruin him, in spite of the fact that man naturally aims at self-preservation and is formed to follow his own interests to the utmost of his ability.[3]
15 But it would appear still stranger that any one should involuntarily do wrong when the initiative[4] for the action lay with him and when he was aware of the particular details of his action, such as the person affected by the act, the act itself, its occasion, its instrument, its purpose, and its manner. It still is thought strange that
20 punishment should be inflicted both for involuntary deeds and for voluntary ones. For, if any one does wrong involuntarily, he deserves pardon and, if he does so voluntarily aiming at a good, surely it is not just that he who pursues a good should be punished. But it would seem much stranger that one should be punished for
25 deeds done under compulsion,[5] since the doer or the victim of the

1. Cf. *Ethics*, 1110b33.

2. Cf. *Ethics*, 1111a29.

3. This difficulty is based on the Socratic paradox that no one sins voluntarily. Cf. Pletho's letter to Bessarion in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, CLXI, 721 A, B.

4. Action the initiative for which lies with the actor (*Ethics*, 1110 a 17) and the details of which are known to him (*ibid.*, 1111a2) is voluntary, according to Aristotle's definition adopted by Gaza (20, 22, n.). This sentence is, therefore, reducible to the form, "How can a voluntary act be an involuntary act?"

5. Gaza has in mind the fact that Plato says all misdeeds are involuntary and yet prescribes penalties for them (*Laws*, 860 E, 861 A). One division of involuntary deeds consists of those done under compulsion, according to Aristotle (*Ethics*, 1109b35).

compulsion contributes nothing toward the initiation of the deeds so done.[1]

Nevertheless these things occur and it is said that a man, though desiring a thing, still acts involuntarily. Those, for example, who jettison cargo from their storm-tossed ships as their only means of preservation are said to do so involuntarily.[2]

Plato, a man distinguished for wisdom, says that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all who transgress do so involuntarily; and those who transgress through anger and desire do so under compulsion.[3] But Aristotle, a friend of Plato's and no less reputed for wisdom, thinks that every single evil-doer does wrong voluntarily. Therefore we must now inquire besides how it is that these two men, who are both wise, differ with each other completely on the same subject. For those who are alike should also think and speak alike.[4] Indeed for my part I could not agree to adopt the arbitrary attitude[5] of praising one of these two men and not the other. We ought rather to do our best, by means of logical distinctions and definitions, to settle the questions raised by Plato and Aristotle and, by an examination of the real meaning of each, to reconcile the two men where they seem to differ, instead of indulging in a wordy and vainly contentious debate.

We call every act voluntary[6] which, being in the power of the actor to do or not, he performs with knowledge and without ignorance of the person affected, the instrument, or the relations of the act and which he performs, too, neither accidentally nor under compulsion. We call involuntary every act initiated by the actor, but done in ignorance of the particular details of the action and followed by remorse and repentance; that too we call involuntary which is compulsory and done under compulsion. But all that is done *through* ignorance (of external facts) is non-voluntary, whereas (only) that which is followed by repentance and remorse is involuntary. The latter would be pardonable. But let a distinction[7] be drawn between acting *through* ignorance and acting *in* ignorance (of principles) and let those acts be considered pardonable which are done not *in* ignorance but *through* ignorance and are the occasion for subsequent repentance; but

1. Aristotle's definition of a deed under compulsion (*Ethics*, 1110a2, b2).

2. Cf. *Ethics*, 1110a8 ff.

3. Cf. *Laws*, 863B.

4. This conviction determines Gaza's whole treatment of the subject.

5. *E.g.*, the attitude of Pletho and of Gennadius.

6. With this paragraph the argument of the tract begins. In it Gaza assumes the Aristotelian definitions of the voluntary and involuntary. Cf. *Ethics*, 1135a23, 1111a22, 1113b24, 1110b18, 1109b35.

7. Cf. *Ethics*, 1110b24.

those should not be considered pardonable which are done not *through* ignorance but *in* ignorance, provided they are not done under stress of suffering that exceeds the limit of nature and human endurance.

5 Let these premises be laid down as I have indicated. By reference to them we must resolve the opposing arguments and prove that the opinions of Plato and Aristotle are in no way contradictory to each other.

The unqualified statement that any one acts with a desire but 10 involuntarily is not true, but in a certain qualified sense it is true.[1] For it is possible that those making jettison of their cargo in the midst of storms act involuntarily in an absolute sense, since no one would make an unmotivated choice of throwing away his property; but, in a certain sense, they act voluntarily, inasmuch 15 as they expect in this way to get clear of the dangers in which they have become involved. This point is borne out by the words of Homer:

"Voluntarily yet with reluctant mind."[2]

There is nothing strange then in the fact that an action should be 20 voluntary in a certain sense but, in an absolute sense, involuntary. But, if an action is involuntary in the way described, it is right to say that one does wrong voluntarily; for every action was assumed to be voluntary of which the initiative was with the actor who knew the individual persons and circumstances concerned in his action, 25 provided that the action was done neither accidentally nor under compulsion. This condition is present in the case of every evil-doer.

There is nothing strange about this[3] because the evil-doer does not aim at the evil as evil and as inimical and ruinous to himself but as good and salutary: he desires it, believing that it is either 30 advantageous or pleasurable. But the good is of two kinds—real and apparent—and desire has both as its objects: the good man's desire is for the real good and the bad man's for the apparent good. It is just that such men should be punished, not because they aim at a good but because they aim at what is not good on the assump- 35 tion that it is. Such is the nature of badness.[4] Hence it turns

1. These lines are an elaboration of *Ethics*, 1110a18 and a9.

2. *Iliad*, IV, 43.

3. That is, that one does wrong voluntarily (21, 21). The previous paragraph had explained the paradox (19,15) of involuntary wrong-doing by arguing that it was also voluntary. This leads the author to a second paradox (19, 9), that of voluntary wrong doing. He proceeds to explain it along with the cognate paradox (19,22) regarding the punishment of those aiming at a good.

4. The obvious translarion of the original "Such a thing is bad" is plainly precluded by the context. Gaza frequently omits the article wirh neuter adjectives used in the sense of abstract nouns, *e.g.*, in the title of the tract.

out that in aiming at a good a man aims at an evil. At least an aim directed toward evil arises in no one except in this unintentional way; for one may hear even Aristotle say that every activity and moral choice aims at some good.[1]

5 Nevertheless, the one who so proves to have desired evil is not free from vice, since it is by his rational faculty that he desires the evil. He is evil himself and he likewise does evil without qualification and absolutely and by the very fact that he desires it; and he does wickedly by actually desiring what is actually 10 evil as though it were good.

For the person who does wrong involuntarily there is pardon on the ground that he repents, since the person who does wrong *through* ignorance and later repents deserves pardon, whereas the person who does not repent does not deserve it. This last case is 15 near that of the man who does wrong *in* ignorance and voluntarily.[2] Let each be called the one who sins *as though in* ignorance. Being akin, they might reasonably share the distinctive name, so that the one who has sinned *through* ignorance and without repentance is said to have sinned voluntarily in a sense and *in* ignorance, 20 and, again, the one who sins *in* ignorance voluntarily is said to sin *through* ignorance and non-voluntarily and involuntarily.

Aristotle also agrees with this view in saying that not only deeds of violence, but also those involving deception are involuntary relationships,[3] such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, kid- 25 napping, assassination, perjury. These are involuntary, since they would be non-voluntary, as the one who suffers them does no wrong and they are not the sort of violent deeds by which the involuntary

1. Cf. *Ethics*, 1094a1.

2. *I.e.*, in ignorance of moral principles or his real interests (*Ethics*, 1110b30). Gaza's operation here consists in fusing two types into one, of which either voluntary or involuntary might be predicated indifferently. The advantage is relative to his purpose. Deeds coming under this fused type may be spoken of in one way by Plato and in the opposite way by Aristotle and yet both ways of speaking may be correct.

3. This argument can scarcely be described as less than a monstrous sophism. Aristotle states (*Ethics*, 1131a1 ff.) that theft, etc., are involuntary relationships, but he does not mean, nor does Gaza suppose him to mean, that the thief acts involuntarily, although the whole discussion has been regarding actions. In other words, Gaza ignores the difference between an action and a passive experience merely in order to make Aristotle seem to use the same language of moral acts that Plato uses of them. The irrational character of the argument is especially apparent in ll. 20-21, where the acts under discussion are said to be involuntary because non-voluntary and non-voluntary because not involuntary; which implies that they are involuntary because not involuntary. If this is really Gaza's meaning, he could scarcely have carried futility further.

has been defined. So the evil man does evil voluntarily, because he acts knowing the details which form the field of his action, but involuntarily, because no one is voluntarily evil, as Plato says, and because a person does not wish what he does not think is
5 good, as Aristotle says in agreement with Plato. Therefore a person wishes evil non-voluntarily, and, after deliberation and choice, he aims according to his wish.[1] This is moral choice. The individual persons and circumstances concerned in moral activity are the objects of deliberation and moral choice. There-
10 fore the wicked man acts non-voluntarily. But one who acts non-voluntarily acts also, as it turns out, involuntarily. It is for this reason[2] that Plato applies the term involuntary to an evil deed (in general), while Aristotle by a change in usage applies it (merely) to a deed involving deception.

15 Furthermore, even if Aristotle does not wish to apply the term involuntary in case one is ignorant of his true interest instead of the particular details of his action, the word cannot be entirely debarred from application to one ignorant of his own true interest[3] since no one is voluntarily ignorant of his interest. Therefore he
20 acts non-voluntarily and receives the name involuntary, used in the same sense as when we say that fraudulent relationships are involuntary.[4]

There are, therefore, three types of those who sin involuntarily: he who does wrong *through* ignorance, he who does so *as though* ignorant, and he who does so *in* ignorance. Of them Plato[5] says
25 that the one who sins *through* ignorance is involved in a simple ignorance, but he who does so *in* ignorance is involved in a double ignorance.[6] But the one who sins *as though* ignorant neither knows

1. Cf. *Ethics*, 1113a11. 2. Cf. 23, 3.

3. That this case comes within the scope of involuntary acts would seem to have been already argued (22, 14-21). Gaza probably reverted to it in order to treat of it in a more decisive manner.

4. The looseness of Gaza's thought is well shown by the fact that he here ignores his earlier inclusion of the type "*through* ignorance" in the composite type "*as though* ignorant." Cf. 22, 14-16. 5. Cf. *Laws*, 863C.

6. Plato means that the man is ignorant and is also ignorant of the fact that he is so. Gaza ignores this obviously correct interpretation and implies that Plato had in mind a classification made first by Aristotle. The third type, those who do wrong *as though* ignorant, is due to Gaza's own classification and he still tries to find a place for it in Plato's scheme by giving it a new name based on Plato's nomenclature. Why this third type should be so named admits naturally of no intelligible explanation. "Logical division" is here used not to clarify the subject, but to reconcile Plato's and Aristotle's words. Unfortunately, the reconciliation does not take into account the difference between Plato's metaphysical and Aristotle's semi-legal purposes in the treatments of the matter.

nor is ignorant. His action is not voluntary either, because he has done what he did not know. Let him be involved *as though* in a double ignorance. The one who sins *through* ignorance should be pardoned, but the one who does so *as though* ignorant and the
5 one who does so *in* ignorance should not be pardoned.

Compulsion also is of two kinds, outer and inner.[1] For both the one who acts contrary to desire and reason[2] is said to act under compulsion and the one violently carried off by a whirlwind is carried off by compulsion. Those who do wrong under outer
10 compulsion no one blames, but every sensible person censures those who yield to the inner compulsion. The incontinent man acts under compulsion because contrary to reason;[3] but not without incurring blame, since the initiative for his action is in his own power and he has not become incontinent of necessity.[4] Would
15 the man then who, through vice, is mastered by wrath and anger do evil under compulsion, as Plato says? He would—if among this class of people, too, action takes place contrary to reason. And it does seem that the wicked are not wholly without calculation and knowledge of things noble.[5] For taking the case of the three
20 states to be avoided in the sphere of ethics—vice, incontinence, and amorality[6]—in regard to all vice and incontinence one must consider that this is so in some sense, if there be not an excessive bias of the character in the direction of amorality. In this way each person might be said to do wrong involuntarily on the ground
25 that he is led on more readily to the deed by his emotion. Hence we see that Plato did not do badly to say that those wicked people who erred through anger and pleasure acted involuntarily, since what is done under compulsion is done, as we agreed, involuntarily.

30 But there is no validity in the plea of those who, in excuse or in defence of themselves, allege compulsion, meaning this compulsion that controls and leads in the souls of the wicked. Punishment ought to be inflicted because one would voluntarily have come to the state of being led by his emotion and of doing wrong under
35 compulsion.

It is plain then that here also Plato and Aristotle have not differed, in speaking as they did regarding the voluntary and involuntary. The one says that evil men are so voluntarily, while the other says that they act involuntarily either on the ground that
40 they act non-voluntarily or on the ground that they act under

1. Cf. 20, 9; also *Ethics*, 1111a24 ff.
2. For this alliance of desire with reason, cf. *Plethe's Criticism*, 63, n. 134.
3. Cf. *Meta.*, 1015a32. 4. Cf. *Ethics*, 1114a19, 20.
5. Cf. *Ethics*, 1145b12 ff.
6. Cf. *Ethics*, 1145a15.

compulsion and mastered by their emotion. For Plato[1] himself also says that the evil act voluntarily, though admittedly in a secondary sense, putting the matter as follows: "We say that pleasure in exercise of its tyrannical power does whatever its will determines." Will and determination are for him characteristic not of involuntary, but of voluntary action. So he thinks that, in one sense, such men act voluntarily and, in another, involuntarily, and he lays down laws concerning involuntary wrongs as though he supposed that some did wrong voluntarily.

Aristotle calls involuntary the deed done through ignorance and with subsequent repentance, while Plato uses this term of an action that sometimes misses one's conception of the best. Although[2] the latter, to be sure, says that the concept of the best, controlling and bringing order into the soul, is thought by the many to cause, when it is mistaken, an involuntary wrong, yet he does not oppose this opinion strongly but, deprecating the argument about terms as contentious and by no means accepting it, he employs the same term as Aristotle does, on the assumption that the act he describes does not differ in any way from that referred to by Aristotle. Therefore, if Plato regards as involuntary the state of those who are ruled and led by their emotion and who are less without calculation of the noble and of virtue than the amoral but more so that the incontinent,[3] this view, involving a difference of words rather than thought, is calculated to perplex those who are phil-Aristotelians rather than philosophers. For Aristotle too speaks with this same meaning when he adds "and not under compulsion" in his definition of the voluntary.[4] For no one will ever do evil voluntarily, especially if it is evil as such,[5] but he might do it under compulsion; for the things done under compulsion are—as he also agrees—those done directly by the actors and contrary to desire and reason.

Now Pletho, holding that all things happen of necessity and nothing happens by chance, tries to maintain that Plato's words are in agreement with his position, on the ground that Plato said

1. Cf. *Laws*, 863 B.

2. To say that an opinion is held by the many is enough to discredit it. Hence the "although." Cf. *Laws*, 864 A, B.

3. Cf. 24, 14-25. This circumlocution to describe the wicked is based on Aristotle's words, the meaning of which has just been asserted to be identical with those of Plato quoted in the preceding sentence. These words appear on the surface to contradict Aristotle's statements regarding the voluntary nature of wickedness and so perplex those who unduly revere Aristotle.

4. Cf. 20, 25-26.

5. Cf. 21, 27-30.

that every wicked person was so of necessity and involuntarily,[1] since he was so either through ignorance or incontinence, or both. It has already been stated in other works[2] that the source of Pletho's error was the fact that he took the term necessity in one sense only, 5 whereas it was really used in many. Necessity is of several kinds:[3] that without which, as a contributory cause, it is impossible to live, *e.g.*, breathing and food; that without which it is impossible for a good to exist or accrue or an evil to be averted, *e.g.*, taking medicine; the compulsory; that which can not be otherwise; that which is as 10 matter in nature and as the motions of matter;[4] here then is also hypothetical necessity, *e.g.*, if this is a man, these (human qualities) must be present in him. Such are the meanings of necessity. Plato says that the wicked man is so involuntarily, alike of the hypothetical necessity and of (inner) compulsion,[5] thereby slightly 15 shifting the meaning of necessity from the compulsory to that done under compulsion due to the controlling and leading element of one's evil character. For things done under compulsion are those done contrary to reason directly by the actors, while compulsory acts are acts of which the initiation comes from without and to 20 which the actor contributes nothing, as, for example, if a whirlwind or men with the power requisite will carry one off.[6] The incontinent man *is* incontinent both involuntarily and by necessity in the sense of being under compulsion, and he *acts* incontinently from necessity of the hypothetical type. For, if one's action is 25 necessary, so is one's moral character. The like holds of the unjust and all other kinds of wrong-doers. In keeping with this principle is the statement of the Saviour, the Son of God, that evil deeds occur among men of necessity but woe to the man by whom they are done.[7]

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1. Probably based on a passage from Pletho's letter to Bessarion, printed in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, CLXI, 721 A, B: "Plato gave his real opinion . . . in the numerous passages where he repeats to the point of weariness that the bad are bad against their will and hence by some necessity."

2. Cf. p. 6. The reference is apparently to some other work or works by Gaza. If so, it must either be a part of his *De Consultatione Naturae* not included in Bessarion's synopsis (*Pletho's Criticism*, 11) or it must be another philosophical tract which is not known. In either case, we may conclude that the *De Fato* was not Gaza's first tract against Pletho.

3. This discussion of necessity is based directly on *Metaphysics*, 1015a20 ff.

4. This "necessity" is not found in the passage from Aristotle but is introduced to be the basis for contingent necessity, which allows for chance. It appears both here and in the examples to be illogically identified with hypothetical, or conditional, necessity. Cf. 28, 23.

5. Cf. 24, 6. 6. Cf. *Ethics*, 1110a3. 7. Cf. 16, 7, note.

In general, a like principle applies to the world of changing phenomena. The causes must be of necessity, if it is intended (or likely) that anything should arise and pass away. And yet it does not arise and pass away of necessity in an absolute sense, as in the sphere of things that have no variability, but as in those which do have a degree of variability.[1] There is much in nature that happens whichever of two ways chance determines[2] and of necessity in the sense of that in matter and the motions of matter.

Plato, saying that every evil person is so of necessity in this sense, denies neither moral choice nor contingency in nature, and in no way contradicts himself when he says, at one time, that the wicked sin of necessity and, at another, that the blame belongs to the chooser; God is blameless.[3]

But Pletho, taking necessity in nature to mean what can not be otherwise,[4] thinks that all things arise and pass away by an absolute necessity; and thereby he denies not only moral choice and wish but also nature. For matter too is nature.[5] (But whether what admits of choice and the so-called self-chosen and self-subsistent is analogous to matter or is different and, if different, how it is different, would be another question.) Yet he also leaves no room for accident, since accident is the beginning and cause of existence,[6] that is, the existence of things not by necessity nor always nor in general but as one of two possible results. Prayers too are at the same time ruled out and supplications and every kind of divine worship; for why should God be called merciful and saviour and protector and averter of evil if all things happen of necessity?

We, however, deny neither fate nor necessity and, in our demonstration, safeguard both contingency and the voluntary. And we do not say any more than Pletho that God can be changed

1. Cf. *Anal. Pr.*, 32b4.

2. Cf. *De Interpr.*, 18b.

3. Cf. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, 718 A; *Pletho's Criticism*, 62; and *Republic*, 617 E.

4. Cf. Pletho's letter to Bessarion, Migne, *ibid.*, 722 D. Pletho allows for only one meaning besides the ordinary one, viz., compulsion.

5. Contingent necessity was described by Gaza as the necessity which is as matter (ὡς ὕλη Cf. 15, 30). This is τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, the necessity operating in nature. It enters into the essence of matter and so of nature. But whether this species of necessity is the same as that which admits of freedom of choice in the individual is another question. Gaza thus by precept, at any rate, separated the question of chance from that of free will. This is a distinct merit, since there was throughout this debate a tendency to confuse the two issues.

6. Cf. *Meta.*, 1026b29.

by prayers and sacrifices.[1] Yet one ought to use prayer and sacrifices and all the customary works of a pious mind with a view to the moving and the changing of something, namely, of what is likely, or intended by God. For the change of what is intended
5 to what will be is accomplished in answer to prayers and sacrifices. Not everything that is intended actually occurs and what will be is not identical with what is intended or likely. For Aristotle too holds that, regarding that of which it is right to say that it will be, it must some time be right to say that it is. But there is nothing
10 to prevent that of which it is right to say that it is intended or likely from never happening at all.[2] In this way, then, the change finds room. Homer bears witness to this truth in the words:

> "And even the gods too may be swayed, though their glory is greater, both their honour and their might; by sacrifices
15 and gentle vows, by libations and burnt offerings, men turn them aside."[3]

But God himself brings the actual event to pass without change. This is the cause of fate and of the necessity in changing phenomena[4] and preserves their existence. For, as things have been ordained
20 by God from eternity, so they all come into being and, as it is their nature to be and become, so they both are and do become. Such an arrangement and constitution of things that are, is eternal, having its fixed character and necessity dependent on a condition.[5] For if it was necessary that these things should be eternal and
25 those perishable, they have been so ordained of necessity; and if it is intended (or likely) that a thing be seen, it is necessary that there be light, since light is the actuality of the visible;[6] and if it is intended (or likely) that a pot should come into existence, it is necessary that there be heat evaporating the moisture from the
30 clay, and, if this is so, these results follow.[7] Pletho does not see this on account of his ignorance of conditional necessity.

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1. Gaza may have thought it desirable to hold that God was unchangeable either to avoid Pletho's dilemma (p. 7) or in consideration of *James*, I, 17.

2. Cf. *Gen. et Cor.*, 337b1.

3. *Il.* IX, 497-500. Plato (*Repub.*, 364 D, E) quoted freely the same passage, but in order to differ with it. Pletho referred with approbation to Plato's quotation in a tract Gaza may have seen (Migne, *Ibid.*, CLX. 856 B).

4. *I.e.*, without change of his intention or eternal purpose which, however, has been modified in a particular case in answer to prayer.

5. Conditional necessity is the necessity of a thing happening in one of two ways. Gaza appears, wrongly, to have limited the application of it to matter and its motions (26, 10). Either this necessity or one of the two possible issues (Gaza leaves it uncertain) is God's intention (τὸ μέλλον) (28, 31.). Cf. pp. 8-9.

6. Cf. *De Anima*, 418b4 and b9.

7. Cf. *De Anim. Gen.*, 718b18.

There are different causes for different individual things, but a common cause of the existence and genesis of all things, namely, their being so ordained and fated by the first cause. One of the things ordained and fated is that those who do righteously shall be 5 saved and those who do wickedly shall perish. This matter also has been dealt with in other works.

Bessarion the Cardinal, in his treatise in defence of Plato regarding fate, does well to admit, at the same time, the existence of the voluntary and of fate; and in general he has defined the 10 question of fate adequately to his purpose and as became a Christian philosopher. But Pletho does ill to interpret Plato's failure to classify sins into voluntary and involuntary as a proof of his belief in absolute necessity. For even if Plato does not see fit to classify them in this way, he does not thereby say that sins are unavoidable 15 by an absolute necessity, but, in a discussion removed as far as possible from such necessity, he classifies sins on a different principle and in such a way as to avoid denying contingency and to make effective the newer element in his own classification. For he plainly says that the bad man differs from the good by the fact 20 that the bad man acts always missing the true concept of the best, but the good man rarely and in small matters, and that this latter kind of action is thought by many to be involuntary wrongdoing.[1] But the misdeeds classified by others as voluntary and involuntary have been classified by Plato as those which miss and those which 25 hit the mark. No logical necessity arises from this statement for rejecting contingency in all the phenomena of existence and change.

To examine, therefore, into such arguments is a worthy task, but to assume a multitude of irreconcilable differences in the words of Aristotle and Plato, to make a division between the two 30 men, and to dispute and quarrel with the partisans of either is anything but a worthy proceeding.[2] On the contrary, it is better to reconcile them in whatever respect they seem to have differed and, following both as though one most excellent leader in knowledge and wisdom, to elucidate the truth in harmony with both; 35 since both the men are wise and worthy of reverence.

1. Cf. 25, 11.
2. Cf. 29, 15.

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